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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v.
KELIN MANIGAULT,
                  Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 05-00187)
District Judge: Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo
Submitted February 25, 2010
Before: CHAGARES, STAPLETON, and LOURIE,  Circuit Judges.*





This matter is before the Court on defendant Kelin Manigault’s appeal of the
2denial of his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  For the reasons below, we will
vacate the order granting the certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. 
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we only briefly summarize
the essential facts.  
On December 9, 2004, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania police recovered a .45 caliber
semi-automatic handgun and thirty-two grams of cocaine base while conducting an
inventory search of an illegally parked car.  The vehicle was registered to Rechina
Stanley, but Ms. Stanley later acknowledged that she had purchased the car on behalf of
Manigault, and that he was the operator of the car at all times.  A warrant was issued for
Manigault’s arrest. 
On March 29, 2005, police observed Manigault sitting in a parked car.  When they
approached the vehicle, Manigault fled, and threw a bag under a nearby car.  Manigault
was caught and placed under arrest, and the bag, which contained forty-one grams of
cocaine base, was recovered. 
Manigault was indicted on May 11, 2005 for five counts of firearm and drug
trafficking offenses.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to two counts of
possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the other charges were dropped. 
3Manigault had two prior felony convictions – one for drug trafficking and one for
reckless endangerment of another person.  In the Presentence Report (“PSR”), the
Probation Officer determined that these two convictions qualified Manigault as a career
offender under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4B1.1.  This
increased his criminal history category from V to VI, and with an offense level of 33, the
recommended Guideline range was determined to be 235 to 293 months in prison.  
Manigault objected to the PSR, specifically arguing that his prior conviction for
reckless endangerment was not a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, and that he
therefore was not a career offender.  The District Court rejected his objections and
sentenced Manigault to 235 months of imprisonment.  On March 21, 2006, Manigault
appealed this judgment to this Court.  Relying upon our precedent in United States v.
Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992), we affirmed the judgment and determination that
reckless endangerment is a crime of violence for the purposes of determining whether a
criminal defendant is a career offender.  United States v. Manigault, 228 F. App’x 183
(3d Cir. 2007).  
On July 10, 2008, Manigault filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) to
reduce his sentence pursuant to the retroactive amendment to the crack cocaine
sentencing guidelines.  On August 6, the District Court agreed that the amendment
reduced his offense level to 31, which reduced his guideline range to 188 to 235 months. 
The District Court subsequently reduced Manigault’s sentence to 188 months.
4Also on July 10, Manigault filed a counseled motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2255.  He alleged three grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel:  (1) that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to file a motion to compel documents regarding his reckless
endangerment conviction; (2) that his counsel was ineffective for inadequately arguing
that reckless endangerment was not a crime of violence; and (3) that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the Government’s arguments at sentencing that his
career offender classification was appropriate.  He also argued that his sentence was
based on inaccurate information and false assumptions in violation of the Due Process
clause.  The District Court denied Manigault’s § 2255 motion, and Manigault filed a
timely notice of appeal and a request for a certificate of appealability. 
In his request for a certificate of appealability, Manigault argued that his
conviction for reckless endangerment was no longer a crime of violence based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).  Although
Begay had been decided before he filed his counseled § 2255 motion, Manigault did not
raise Begay before the District Court or argue that there had been any recent change in the
relevant law.  On July 16, 2009, a panel of this Court granted a certificate of appealability
on the following issues:  
(1) whether Manigault may relitigate his challenge to his career offender status
based on a change in the applicable law; Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
1581 (2008); United States v. Palumbo, 608 F.2d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1979);
Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974); (2) whether Manigault waived
this claim by not bringing Begay to the District Court’s attention despite its
availability; (3) what details of the reckless endangerment conviction are
 We will assume arguendo that Begay applies retroactively to Manigault’s claim,1
see Sun Bear v. United States, 611 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2010); Gilbert v. United States, 609
F.3d 1159, 1165 (11th Cir. 2010); Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2010),
and that his conviction for reckless endangerment would no longer qualify as a crime of
violence.  See United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because we
conclude that the claim does not present a constitutional issue, we need not reach the
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available in documents appropriate under a Shepard [v. United States, 544
U.S. 13 (2005)] analysis; and (4) the outcome of the state drug charges
pending during sentencing and the impact additional drug convictions would
have on any resentencing.  
App. at  20.
II.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.  We lack
appellate jurisdiction unless the applicant has made such a showing.  United States v.
Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  In Cepero, the defendant argued that
the District Court misapplied the sentencing guidelines because the Government failed to
show that he had sold crack cocaine and not some other form of cocaine base.  Id.  We
concluded that we lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the misapplication of the
guidelines in that case did not present a constitutional issue.  However, we noted that we
were not suggesting that such an error could never rise to the level of a constitutional
deprivation.  Id. at 268 n.6.
Thus, the question is whether the Begay claim Manigault seeks to raise on appeal
alleges an error  that rises to the level of a violation of a constitutional right.   Manigault1 2
question of whether Manigault waived his Begay claim.
 As for the claims Manigault raised in his § 2255 motion in the District Court, we2
conclude that Manigault has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right for essentially the reasons given by the District Court.
  We acknowledge that one Court of Appeals has addressed a similar claim based3
on Begay on appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion.  The court in Sun Bear believed
that the defendant’s Begay claim was not an ordinary claim of the misapplication of the
sentencing guidelines.  Rather, it believed the claim was based on a change in the law that
made the District Court’s sentencing calculations unlawful.  The court concluded that this
“inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice and presents exceptional
circumstances that justify collateral relief under § 2255.”  Sun Bear, 611 F.3d at 930
(quoting Davis, 417 U.S. at 346-47).  While the Sun Bear court addressed the
6
contends that he argued in his § 2255 motion that “constitutional violation(s) led to a
sentence based on inaccurate information and false assumptions.”  Reply Brief at 11. 
However, Manigault was not sentenced on inaccurate information or false assumptions in
violation of his rights to due process under the Fifth Amendment; his sentence was
correct under our caselaw at the time.  Rather, the legal consequences of his prior offense
changed after Begay.  
Manigault argued that his sentencing guidelines range would be 168 to 210 months
without the career offender designation.  App. at 85.  Manigault’s sentence of 188 months
does not exceed the maximum of that guidelines range.   Nor does his sentence exceed the
statutory maximum of 480 months for his conviction.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
Manigault has not made a substantial showing of the denial of any constitutional right;
rather, he alleges only that, after Begay, the application of the career offender
enhancement to his sentence violates the sentencing guidelines.   Under Cepero, this is3
cognizability of the claim under § 2255, it did not address whether the claim alleged a
violation of a constitutional right under § 2253(c)(2), a distinct issue.  Davis, 417 U.S. at
345-47; Cepero, 224 F.3d at 267 (“Section 2255 petitions . . . serve only to protect a
defendant from a violation of the constitution or from a statutory defect so fundamental
that a complete miscarriage of justice has occurred. . . . Under § 2253(c)(2), we have
appellate jurisdiction over only those issues substantially shown to deny a petitioner a
constitutional right.”).  
7
not sufficient for the issuance of a certificate of appealability.  
III.
For the above reasons, we will vacate the order granting the certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
